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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the crisis policies of the ‘troika’ institutions to Greece in the context of 
the Eurozone crisis. The neoliberal policies of fiscal austerity and internal devaluation 
prescribed by the troika had a strong contractionary impact which resulted in a prolonged 
recession of the Greek economy. For this reason, the research question of this study is to what 
extent the IMF, the EC and the ECB have been questioning the appropriateness of the 
prescribed crisis policies to Greece. Building on neo-Gramscian theory, the causal mechanism 
claims that the hegemony of neoliberalism within the troika institutions conditions a specific 
diagnosis of the Eurozone crisis and hence a specific set of policy responses. Analysing the 
positions on central dimensions of neoliberalism with regard to financial crises, a striking 
persistence of neoliberal policies is observed. In light of neo-Gramscian theory, this 
observation suggests that the first grand systemic crisis of the 21
st
 century has not seen the 
rise of a challenging counter-hegemonic ideology. It also suggests that the transmittance of 
ideological change from global to regional economic governance is not necessarily instant. It 
is thus fundamental to advocate strong alternatives to neoliberalism which could bring the 
long reign of neoliberalism and international finance to an end. 
 
 
Keywords:  Eurozone Crisis, Greece, Troika, Economic Governance, Neo-Gramscianism, 
Hegemony, Neoliberalism. 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis and the ensuing Eurozone crisis can be seen as the first grand 
“systemic crises of capitalism” of the 21st century (Wallerstein 2008). The sudden contraction 
of the subprime mortgage market in the United States in 2007 resulted in a global financial 
crisis and at last revealed the fragility of international financial markets after almost a decade 
of flourish (Nesvetailova and Palan 2008, 167-169). In 2008, Hungary marks the first EU 
member state since 1976 to apply for financial assistance by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (Harmon 1997, 299). Following Hungary’s request, also Latvia and Romania applied 
for financial assistance by the troika until 2009. With the Greek request for financial 
assistance in early 2010, the crisis in the Eurozone effectively began (Jost and Seitz 2012, 2). 
In the institutional set-up of global economic governance established after the Second World 
War, the IMF is responsible for the management of financial crises by providing financial 
assistance to governments. A novelty in the IMF programmes in the context of the unfolding 
Eurozone crisis is its close cooperation with regional institutions. In fact, all programmes to 
EU member states have been under the auspice of the so-called ‘troika’, consisting of the 
IMF, the European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB). This paper will 
focus on Greece because the country was the first Eurozone member to request financial 
assistance and also required the largest amount of assistance. After the initial request in April 
2010, a ‘First Economic Adjustment Programme’ has been launched for the period of May 
2010 to June 2013. A ‘Second Economic Adjustment Programme’ was issued for the period 
of March 2012 to August 2014. After these two joint programmes, Greece currently is under a 
‘Third Economic Adjustment Programme’ by the Eurozone until 2018 (European 
Commission 2016b). 
Seven years after the initial request for financial assistance, the results of the structural 
adjustment programmes in Greece seem to indicate a failure of the programmes as the Greek 
economy underwent a dramatic recessionary period. Instead of the initial projection of two 
recessionary years, Greece in fact endured seven years of recession since the global financial 
crisis in 2008. Since the start of the programmes in 2010, youth unemployment rose to 50 
percent, the unemployment rate increased by 17 percent, the average wages declined by 16 
percent, the poverty rate increased by 17 percent, and societal inequality rose by 10 percent. 
Ironically, the sovereign debt of Greece has increased by another 34 percent (OECD 2017). 
Shambaugh argues that the Eurozone crisis consists of three distinct but linked crises of 
banking, sovereign debt and macroeconomics (2012, 158). The complexity and magnitude of 
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the Eurozone crisis most notably in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus is manifest in 
the unprecedented volume of provided financial assistance. While the neoliberal policies 
attempt to address these core symptoms of the Eurozone crisis, they fail to incorporate 
systemic factors such as mechanisms of international finance or institutional fallacies of the 
Eurozone. As put forward by neo-Gramscian scholars such as Overbeek, these systemic 
factors can both explain the build-up of the Eurozone crisis and the ineffectiveness of the 
neoliberal crisis policies prescribed by the troika (2012, 31). Given these theoretical critiques 
and the strong recessionary impact of the crisis policies, this paper aims to answer the 
following research question: To what extent has the troika been questioning the 
appropriateness of its prescribed measures to Greece over the course of the Eurozone crisis? 
This paper argues that the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony can contribute to an enhanced 
understanding of the troika crisis management by theorizing its policy preferences. Hegemony 
as an established “lived system of meanings and values” (Williams 1978, 110) severely 
inhibits the thinking in alternatives to the hegemonic ideology. The causal mechanism of this 
paper argues that neoliberal hegemony conditions a specific diagnosis of the Eurozone crisis 
and hence a specific set of policy responses. This is hypothesised to render critical self-
reflection on the part of the troika inconceivable, thus perpetuating the prescription of 
neoliberal policies to Greece and deepening the recession. The aim of this paper is to test the 
hegemony of neoliberalism within the troika institutions by tracing the process of the three 
economic adjustment programmes for Greece. According to neo-Gramscian theory, systemic 
crises such as the Eurozone crisis present scarce opportunities to effectively challenge 
existing hegemonies (Cox 1996, 140-141). It is thus critical to explore whether any of the 
troika institutions has fundamentally altered its crisis policies. This might indicate the rise of a 
challenging counter-hegemonic ideology which could bring the long reign of neoliberalism 
and international finance to an end. Due to the critical role of the IMF in the ideological 
positioning of global economic governance (Peet 2009, 17), this paper will primarily focus on 
this institution and analyse the EC and the ECB as control variables in the Greek case. As 
elaborated in the subsequent section, the neoliberal perspective on the Eurozone crisis 
prioritizes debt and competitiveness as the main causes of the crisis. This view on the crisis 
conditions the troika’s policy responses of fiscal austerity, internal devaluation and reluctant 
restructuring of Greece’s sovereign debt, the operationalized dimensions of neoliberalism.  
In the subsequent part, contrasting theoretical conceptions of Greece and of the troika’s 
responses in the context of the Eurozone crisis will be discussed. A theoretical frame based on 
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neo-Gramscian theory will be developed for the hypothesis that the hegemony of 
neoliberalism can explain the absent critical self-reflection on the part of the troika. As 
elaborated in the methodological chapter, this congruence procedure will be tested by process-
tracing the evolution of the troika programmes for Greece over the course of the crisis.  
 
2. Literature Review 
In understanding the troika’s response to the Eurozone crisis in general and to Greece in 
particular, it is fundamental to explore the competing perceptions on what has caused the 
crisis. This literature review categorizes the divergent views along two theoretical 
perspectives, namely neoliberalism and neo-Gramscianism. As subsequently elaborated, the 
neoliberal perspective prioritizes debt and competitiveness as causes of the Eurozone crisis, 
whereas neo-Gramscian scholars emphasise the mechanisms of international finance and 
institutional flaws of the Eurozone.  
 
2.1. The neoliberal perspective 
In the institutional design of the Eurozone, the potential problem of elevated sovereign debt 
levels is addressed by the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Any EU member state 
agreed to avoid ‘excessive’ public deficits by keeping annual budget deficits below three 
percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and total debt levels below 60 percent of GDP 
(EUR-Lex 2008). Any government running ‘excessive’ public deficits hence breaches the 
TFEU and will be financially sanctioned by the European Union. Despite these clear rules 
governing sovereign debt, only two of the 28 EU member states appear to have respected the 
established threshold. All other member states have at least once breached the threshold and 
had to undergo an ‘Excessive Deficit Procedure’ (European Commission 2016a). 
In theoretical economics, the value of sovereign debt for an economy is contested. On the one 
hand, advocates of Keynes argue that sovereign debt is a stimulating force. Expansive fiscal 
policies are theorized as directly contributing to enhanced growth rates by increasing total 
demand (Haavelmo 1945, 311). Neoliberal economists on the other hand are more cautious 
about the supposed value of sovereign debt. Diamond for instance claims that the interests on 
increased sovereign debt levels will ultimately be financed through elevated tax rates for 
individual citizens. In turn, individual citizens have less available income which will, by 
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mechanisms of the capital market, increase the interest rates and thus negatively affect growth 
rates (1965, 1137-1139). Diamond’s claim reflects the neoliberal conception of the state 
which should primarily enable a ‘free market’ which governs itself (Harvey 2007, 20). In a 
similar vein, Modigliani emphasises the detrimental long-term effects of elevated sovereign 
debt levels which disproportionally burden the ‘next generation’ (1961, 731). This neoliberal 
conception of the value of sovereign debt is supported by empirical studies such as by 
Schclarek: with regard to developing economies, he finds that sovereign debt negatively 
affects economic growth due to mechanisms of capital markets. Interestingly, his study is not 
corroborating this negative relation of sovereign debt on growth rates for developed 
economies (2004, 15). Empirical support for the sovereign debt rules established by the 
European Union can be found among others in the work of Reinhart and Rogoff. They claim 
that sovereign debt levels above 90 percent of GDP in developed economies result in lower 
growth rates compared to economies with sovereign debt levels below 30 percent of GDP 
(2010, 575). 
With regard to Greece in the context of the Eurozone crisis, its sovereign debt levels have 
most notably been perceived as unsustainable by financial markets. Reporting sovereign debt 
levels over 100 percent of GDP for the last decade, Greece was in fact never appearing to 
comply with the threshold established by the European Union. The global financial crisis of 
2008 further elevated sovereign debt levels to 146 percent of GDP in 2010 (Trading 
Economics 2017). After the Greek government announced in late 2009 that previous reports 
on the amount of the annual deficit have been considerably understated, the country 
effectively lost the trust of financial markets. No longer able to borrow at sustainable terms, 
the government hence turned to the IMF and the Eurozone for financial assistance (The 
Economist 2010). Reducing the amount of Greece’s sovereign debt was thus to be a 
cornerstone of the troika’s response to the crisis. Fiscal austerity was expected to result in 
increased growth rates through a renewed investment boom. For this purpose, market 
confidence ought to be restored by implementing drastic austerity measures from the very 
start of the troika programme (International Monetary Fund 2010b, 3). 
In addition to the problem of sovereign debt, the troika equally regarded competitiveness as a 
central reason for Greece’s crisis. In the words of IMF official Thomsen: “Greece faced two 
fundamental problems: a high fiscal deficit which threatened its access to capital markets; and 
a lack of competitiveness which threatened the country’s future growth and development” 
(International Monetary Fund 2010c). Since competitiveness essentially relates to relative 
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prices, two instruments are conceivable for achieving a more competitive national economy. 
According to Friedman, the instrument of nominal devaluation is to be preferred to internal 
devaluation since currency exchange rates are more flexible than internal prices (1953, 164-
165). In times of recession, a government is therefore more likely to achieve the hoped 
economic recovery by adjusting the value of its currency rather than adjusting internal wages. 
The empirical study by Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk states that downward wage 
adjustments have indeed been significantly less frequent than upward wage adjustments 
(2014, 15). Apart from the fact that internal devaluation is difficult to achieve, it will also 
render the recession considerably more socially costly than nominal devaluation which does 
not directly affect the welfare of citizens. In a monetary union, a single economy such as 
Greece is not able to devaluate its currency and can therefore only increase its 
competitiveness by means of internal devaluation. In other words, only the ECB can devaluate 
the common currency in the Eurozone which however would not create a competitive 
advantage for a single member of the union since all economies are equally devaluated. Only 
by exiting the Eurozone would Greece regain monetary autonomy and could reach a 
competitive advantage with regard to other economies by devaluating its national currency. 
According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), all Eurozone economies apart from Latvia 
and Lithuania can be classified as belonging to the highest stage of development which is 
‘innovation-driven’ (Schwab 2009, 8-12). Among the Eurozone economies however, a stark 
disparity of competitiveness scores persists. In 2009, for example, Greece has been the least 
competitive economy of the Eurozone, almost 60 ranks behind Germany. In fact, Greece has a 
‘competitive disadvantage’ in two-third of the sub-variables used for the competitiveness 
index. Among the ‘problematic factors for doing business’, state bureaucracy, labour 
regulations, corruption, and tax regulations stand out (Schwab 2009, 14, 156-157). Rather 
than solely adjusting wages therefore, the structural adjustment programmes of the troika 
attempted to address a broad range of issues in the hope of significantly increasing Greece’s 
competitiveness. This increased competitiveness through internal devaluation would boost 
Greece’s export sectors and thus considerably enhance growth rates. 
 
2.2. The reception of troika policies 
The troika sought to address Greece’s crisis by fiscal austerity and internal devaluation. The 
provided financial assistance was directed towards the private international creditors of 
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Greece, being primarily French and German banks (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 84). Despite the 
seemingly unsustainable volume of Greece’s sovereign debt, the IMF programme of 2010 
regarded the sovereign debt as “sustainable in the medium term with disciplined programme 
implementation” (International Monetary Fund 2010a, 20). Therefore, Greece’s international 
creditors have not been pushed by the troika to restructure the country’s sovereign debt. Only 
the second programme of 2012 involved a debt restructuring on the part of Greece’s private 
international creditors. Rather than addressing the problem of sovereign debt by reducing its 
volume, the troika hence solely shifted the lions-share of the debt from European banks to the 
IMF and Eurozone governments. This policy certainly reduces the risk of further bank 
defaults in Europe but is not facilitating Greece’s economic recovery. Unsurprisingly, the 
amount of sovereign debt further increased during the crisis to about 180 percent of GDP 
(Brunsden 2016). Already at the time of the first troika programme, observers argued that 
“only debt restructuring can save Greece” (Weinberg 2010). The eventual debt restructuring 
under the second programme in 2012 has generally been perceived as being “too little, too 
late, despite the historically unprecedented debt relief” (Xafa 2012). 
In addition to the initially absent debt restructuring, also fiscal austerity has been negatively 
received by observers. It has been argued that achieving growth by means of pro-cyclical 
fiscal austerity measures in Greece was in fact unlikely because of its membership in a 
monetary union. In theory, governmental fiscal austerity measures as required by the troika 
ought to be alleviated by a loose monetary policy by the central bank to effectively restore 
growth rates (Theodoropoulou and Watt 2015, 77-80). As argued by Eichengreen et al., the 
fiscal austerity measures were likely to further aggravate the recession since the ECB has 
been reluctant to pursue compensating expansionary monetary policies in the early stages of 
the crisis (2014, 305). The problems inherent to monetary unions will be further discussed in 
the next section. 
With regard to internal devaluation, the reception has similarly been negative. Since 
competitiveness relates to relative prices, the actions of Greece alone cannot significantly 
increase its competitiveness if all the other economies undertake similar policies. In the 
Eurozone crisis, internal devaluation has been prescribed to all countries that applied for 
financial assistance by the troika. There can, therefore, be no gain in competitiveness with 
regard to similar Eurozone economies. In fact, the success of internal devaluation policies 
crucially depends on inflation rates in Germany, the leading Eurozone economy. The country 
equally adopted austerity measures during the crisis which have been keeping inflation rates 
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low, thus rendering a success of internal devaluation by the other economies unlikely (Tilford 
2014). As with fiscal austerity, the prescribed measures can be expected to further aggravate 
the recession rather than enabling a quick recovery. As neo-Gramscian scholars argue, the 
central problem of the crisis policies of the troika is its diagnosis of the causes which fails to 
acknowledge more structural issues. 
 
2.3. The neo-Gramscian perspective 
Of the structural causes emphasised by neo-Gramscian scholars, critiques of international 
finance and the Eurozone stand out. Instead of creating a patchwork of responses to individual 
cases as done by the troika, much broader and deeper responses are needed according to neo-
Gramscian scholars. 
With regard to the role of international finance, De Grauwe and Ji for instance argue that the 
levels of sovereign debt contributed little to the effective financial troubles of Eurozone 
economies. In their comparison of economies part of monetary unions and ‘stand-alone 
countries’, they find that financial markets have reacted differently to similarly unsustainable 
sovereign debt levels in ‘stand-alone countries’. Whereas the costs of borrowing have 
drastically increased for Eurozone countries such as Greece, Ireland or Portugal, economies 
such as Japan, the United States or South Korea have been able to borrow at almost 
unchanged costs from financial markets. They argue that the Eurozone crisis presents a “self-
fulfilling liquidity crisis” caused by the vulnerability of monetary unions, not by the 
individual sovereign debt levels of Greece and other Eurozone economies (2013, 31-32). 
The role of rating agencies in the immediate build-up of the Eurozone crisis has equally been 
investigated. Gärtner, Griesbach, and Jung find a considerable decrease of official ratings in 
early 2009 which is not reflecting the evolution of the effective volume of sovereign debt. It 
can thus be argued that rating agencies played a major role in the unfolding of a ‘self-
fulfilling liquidity crisis’ by disproportionally worrying about the sustainability of sovereign 
debt held by Eurozone economies (2011, 298). While the rating agencies downgraded the 
Eurozone members in early 2009, Greece has further been downgraded during the course of 
the first programme. A major reason for the negative ratings in the first year has in fact been 
the “deeper-than-expected recession” (Moody’s 2011) which is directly caused by the 
contractionary policies of the programme itself. After an initial recessionary period, a return 
of market confidence was foreseen, which would increase growth rates (International 
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Monetary Fund 2010a, 8-9). It seems therefore that the country has not been given the 
opportunity to effectively implement the programme and reach the stage in which a renewed 
investment boom ought to lead the economic recovery. By the continuous downgrading of 
Greece, rating agencies certainly played a role in the prolongation of the recession. 
An underlying cause of the Eurozone crisis is hence the power of finance which can disrupt 
real economies. Overbeek argues that the increased financialisation of European economies 
over the last decades has played a major part in the build-up of the crisis. The expansion of 
the financial sector with regard to productive sectors effectively began in the 1970s as a 
response to the structural crises of that decade. The growth generated in the decades since the 
1970s is regarded as primarily emerging from financial sectors and thus being largely 
speculative in nature (2012, 31-33). A burst of financial markets is unavoidable after a certain 
amount of time and is hence not primarily caused by the accumulation of large amounts of 
sovereign debt by Greece. The diagnosis of the crisis is thus shifted. Rather than 
implementing fiscal austerity, neo-Gramscian scholars would support a restructuring of 
sovereign debt, stricter regulations of financial sectors and enhanced accountability for their 
actions in order to lower the probability of renewed financial crises. They would equally 
support more counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies to return to growth rather than pro-
cyclical contractionary policies as prescribed by the troika (Overbeek 2012, 41). 
In addition to the emphasis on the role of international finance, neo-Gramscian scholars note 
institutional fallacies in the Eurozone. Economic cooperation has in fact not been followed by 
enhanced political cooperation with the creation of a banking or fiscal union. Since the 
establishment of the Eurozone, a wide gap has emerged between Europe’s core and periphery. 
In line with dependency theory, the development of the core necessarily results in the 
underdevelopment of the periphery (Frank 1967, 3). Germany and France for example have 
been able to further increase their competitiveness with regard to smaller Eurozone economies 
and were thus able to export to these economies. The core’s current account surpluses mean 
that economies such as Greece, Spain or Portugal chronically suffer from current account 
deficits which have to be financed by credit. The capital gains of the core from exporting to 
Eurozone economies have directly been ‘recycled’ by providing the credit needed by the 
periphery (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 87). These significant differences in economic performance 
have already been present before the creation of the Eurozone. The so-called ‘optimum 
currency area’ argues that certain conditions have to be given in order to ensure that the 
benefits of an established monetary union exceed the costs. According to this theory, the costs 
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of abandoning monetary autonomy will only be outweighed if there would be “high labour 
mobility, a high level of interregional trade, and a low incidence of region-specific demand 
and supply shocks” (Obstfeld, Alesina and Cooper 1997, 269). Most notably labour mobility 
has never been high enough in the Eurozone, making it a vulnerable construct due to the 
disparities in economic performance. Due to absent autonomy over monetary policy and the 
constraints on fiscal policies posed by the TFEU, Eurozone economies cannot overcome 
crises but by means of internal devaluation. The prospects of this policy are however limited 
due to the considerable gap between the core and the periphery. If the core equally adopts 
further austerity measures, the prospects for internal devaluation prescribed by the troika to 
overcome the competitiveness of the periphery are close to inexistent. 
With regard to the causes of the crisis, neo-Gramscian theory thus fundamentally differs with 
regard to neoliberalism. The neoliberal emphasis on sovereign debt and competitiveness are 
merely regarded as symptoms of underlying systemic fallacies of modern capitalism. To 
address the financialisation of economies and institutional flaws of the Eurozone requires far-
reaching reforms which transcend the primarily national focus of the troika programmes. The 
theoretical frame developed for this paper builds on the critical neo-Gramscian concept of 
hegemony. The purpose of the subsequent section is to illuminate on neoliberal ideology and 
how its hegemonic status relates to the troika policies to Greece in the Eurozone crisis.  
 
2.3.1. Theoretical Frame 
Neo-Gramscian scholars conceptualize the period since the late 1970s as the stage of 
international finance capital, with the spread of mostly American banks and multinational 
enterprises (van der Pijl 2012, 265). States, due to the forces of globalised finance, are 
increasingly under pressure to adhere to neoliberal principles in order to maintain a constant 
afflux of transnational investment (Cox 1996, 193). Based on deregulation, privatisation, and 
liberalisation, neoliberal theory perceives the state’s role as the facilitator of “profitable 
capital accumulation on the part of both private and foreign capital” (Harvey 2007, 7). In 
contrast to Keynesian thought, neoliberalism greatly enhances the internationalization of 
capital, due to the limited regulation of international capital flows. Harvey claims that the rise 
of neoliberalism can be seen as a political project aiming to restore the power of economic 
elites. Despite the presentation of neoliberalism as the solution to the structural problems of 
capitalism prevailing in the 1970s, it rather functioned as a justifying system for the 
  s1773976 
12 
 
perpetuation of the power relations inherent in capitalism (2007, 16). Since the 1970s, 
neoliberalism thus “redistributed rather than generated wealth” and therefore “restored the 
power of economic elites” (Harvey 2007, 159, 19). Contemporary neo-Gramscian scholars 
have argued that neoliberalism has reached hegemonic status due to its widespread 
acceptance, and is thus legitimizing the policies serving a so-called ‘transnational capitalist 
class’ (Sklair 2002, 145). For neo-Gramscian scholars, change can in fact only occur through 
the construction of counter-hegemonic alliances that can challenge the existing hegemonic 
class rule during a systemic crisis (Cox 1996, 140-141). The Eurozone crisis in fact presents 
such a systemic crisis in which neoliberalism could be challenged and the long reign of 
international finance brought to an end. 
Neo-Gramscian theory is a critical theory building on Marxist ideology. The neo-Gramscian 
concept of hegemony enriches Marx’s notion of class struggle. Despite all material conditions 
ripe for a communist revolution, Gramsci argues that bourgeois hegemony effectively hinders 
the occurrence of revolutions (Gramsci 2000, 249). Hegemony is a type of political relation, 
not primarily based on coercive capacities of the dominant, but on the consent of the 
dominated. Countering Marx’s emphasis on coercive capabilities of the bourgeoisie, Gramsci 
states that the ideational power of a class is crucial in the maintenance and reproduction of its 
superiority (2000, 249). Through institutions such as the church or the school, the bourgeois 
class can infuse society with its ideology. Societies are thus consenting to the hegemony of a 
particular class due to successful ideological legitimization, which renders the established 
socio-political hierarchy natural (Gramsci 2000, 196, 251). Considerable inequalities between 
the dominant and the dominated would at a certain point result in a revolution according to 
Marx. Hegemony however hinders the mobilization of the dominated because the inflicted 
inequalities are not regarded by them as a cause for revolution but as enabling their individual 
welfare. The established “lived system of meanings and values” (Williams 1978, 110) thus 
severely inhibits the thinking in alternatives to the hegemonic ideology.  
With regard to Greece in the Eurozone crisis, the following causal mechanism is established. 
Due to the hegemony of neoliberal ideology within the troika, a specific diagnosis of the 
causes is prioritised. This in turn conditions the choice of policy responses which ought to 
address the crisis in Greece. Alternative perceptions and solutions such as counter-cyclical 
policies or debt forgiveness are effectively crowded out due to the neoliberal hegemony, 
rendering critical self-reflection inconceivable. This is in line with George and Bennett’s view 
on assessing the causal role of ideas in decision-making. They argue that ideologies can 
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influence the diagnosis of a problem and the choice of policies to address that problem (2005, 
193). The prescribed measures considerably deepen the recession which primarily affects the 
broader Greek society while avoiding a Greek sovereign default to the benefit of private 
international creditors. The subsequent hypothesis is formulated in order to test the causal 
mechanism: The troika does not question the appropriateness of its prescribed measures to 
Greece due to the hegemony of neoliberalism. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Method of Analysis 
The empirical analysis is based on the triangulation of congruence procedure and process-
tracing. As elaborated in the causal mechanism, the congruence procedure does not expect the 
troika to question the appropriateness of the prescribed measures to Greece because of the 
hegemony of neoliberalism. The neoliberal hegemony is thus the independent variable which 
ought to explain the dependent outcome being the persistence of neoliberal policies in Greece. 
In order to assess whether this hypothesised congruence can be regarded as causal, process-
tracing is used to establish a detailed account of the programmes for Greece in the Eurozone 
crisis (George and Bennett 2005, 182). This allows tracing if and to which extent the three 
dimensions of neoliberalism have been altered by the troika. The time period from the first 
programme in 2010 until the time of writing in 2017 will be divided in three key moments of 
examination. t1 consists of the negotiations on the ‘First Structural Adjustment Programme for 
Greece’, t2 refers to the negotiations on the ‘Second Structural Adjustment Programme’ and t3 
consists of the negotiations on the ‘Third Structural Adjustment Programme’. Since the IMF 
does not financially contribute to the third programme, t3 will primarily serve to test the 
control variables, being the EC and the ECB. To measure the hegemony of neoliberalism, the 
analysis most notably relies on direct sources on the negotiations such as statements by 
officials or institutional documents. If direct sources should not be sufficiently available, 
secondary sources such as journalist or academic articles will be used. 
As previously announced, the EC and the ECB within the troika will serve as the main control 
variable due to this paper’s focus on the ideological positioning of global economic 
governance. This paper thus primarily analyses the IMF’s role within the troika and uses the 
EC and the ECB as control variables rather than equivalent independent variables in a 
complex causal process. Nonetheless, the control variables will equally be tested on the 
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respective hegemonic status of neoliberalism. The empirical analysis might reveal that the 
IMF is not the most influential institution within the troika and that the persistence of 
neoliberal policies in Greece is caused by the EC and/or the ECB. The causal mechanism 
would hence be spurious in the sense that one of the control variables outweighs the influence 
of the independent variable (George and Bennett 2005, 185). This would signify that global 
economic governance is outweighed by regional economic governance in this instance. If the 
IMF was the only institution within the troika to change its policies, this might suggest a non-
automatic transmittance of the ideological evolution undertaken within global economic 
governance. Since this paper is investigating a ‘within-case study’, the findings of the 
empirical analysis cannot necessarily be generalised beyond the case of Greece. Similar 
studies on the cases of Portugal, Ireland, Spain or Cyprus would hence further strengthen the 
validity of the proposed causal mechanism. 
 
3.2. Operationalization 
The causal mechanism of this paper consists of two concepts, being hegemony and 
neoliberalism. With regard to the case of Greece, the concept of neoliberalism has three 
dimensions. A neoliberal structural adjustment programme is expected to entail fiscal 
austerity rather than expansionary fiscal policies. This choice is conditioned by the theoretical 
perception that sovereign debt negatively affects growth rates. While still coded as neoliberal, 
moderate and gradual austerity measures would be regarded as less neoliberal than severe 
austerity measures amounting to more than 10 percent of GDP. The programme is also 
expected to promote internal devaluation as the means to overcome the crisis rather than 
encouraging Greece to exit the Eurozone or supporting expansionary fiscal policies. 
Regaining monetary autonomy would allow Greece to devaluate its currency in order to 
increase its competitiveness and hopefully return to growth without suppressing wages. While 
nominal devaluation would be preferable to internal devaluation, Greece’s membership in the 
Eurozone does not allow such nominal devaluation. The third dimension of neoliberalism 
concerns sovereign debt restructuring. Since neoliberal ideology has primarily benefited 
international finance, the troika is expected to protect Greece’s private international creditors 
from a default. This means that a restructuring of Greece’s sovereign debt ought to be avoided 
in order to keep the risk of renewed banking crises in Europe’s core at bay. It is however 
conceivable that the troika regards a limited sovereign debt restructuring as necessary in order 
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to avoid a complete default of Greece on its debt. A limited restructuring would affect private 
international creditors less than an outright Greek default. 
The concept of hegemony is directly dependent on the concept of neoliberalism. If all three 
dimensions of neoliberalism are observed to be constantly present over the course of the 
Eurozone crisis, neoliberalism can be considered as being hegemonic. If the process-tracing 
indeed finds this observation, the hypothesis based on congruence procedure can be regarded 
as corroborated. If the troika appears to question one dimension by moving away from the 
theoretical expectations formulated above, then neoliberalism might only have a ‘qualified 
hegemony’. If two of the three neoliberal dimensions change over the course of the crisis, the 
hegemony of neoliberalism can be regarded as ‘contested’. In line with neo-Gramscian 
theory, such a ‘contested’ hegemony would be outweighed by an alternative ideology. If the 
empirical analysis reveals that all three dimensions have in fact been changed during the 
crisis, the hegemony of neoliberalism would be ‘absent’. Under the observation of a 
‘contested’ or an ‘absent’ hegemony, the hypothesis has to be refuted and the causal 
mechanism reconsidered. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. The negotiations on the first programme 
Between April 21
st
 and May 3
rd
, 2010, a mission comprising IMF, EC and ECB officials has 
been negotiating with Greece on financial assistance for the period of 2010 to 2013. Eurozone 
member states were to disburse a total of €80 billion of bilateral loans and the IMF was to 
provide €30 billion to overcome a Greek sovereign default. Both the IMF and the EC on 
behalf of the Eurozone member states signed individual structural adjustment programmes 
with Greece (European Commission 2010, 1, 49). The programmes foresaw an “exceptionally 
strong frontloaded fiscal effort” and substantial downward adjustments of wages and benefits 
as well as structural reforms to improve competitiveness. Greece’s sovereign debt was judged 
to be sustainable under the assumption that the programme will be implemented (International 
Monetary Fund 2010a, 1, 20). 
 
 
 
 
  s1773976 
16 
 
The first dimension - fiscal policies 
The negotiations on the first dimension concerning fiscal austerity appear to have resulted in 
largely similar outcomes regarding the specifics in the IMF and EC programmes. The EC 
required fiscal austerity measures amounting to 18 percent of GDP over four years. The 
primary consolidation policies were to be implemented in the first year of the programme and 
decrease in intensity over time. Most notably, the Greek state had to reduce its expenditures 
and increase its income by means of higher VAT (European Commission 2010, 13-15). The 
IMF programme on the other hand required fiscal austerity measures amounting to 16 percent 
of GDP primarily arising from reduced expenditures and increased taxes, most notably 
through higher VAT (International Monetary Fund 2010a, 11). Higher VAT rates as required 
by the troika are not expected to lower societal inequalities since VAT is not a progressive 
type of taxation. The strong up-front fiscal commitments enshrined in the programme are in 
line with the neoliberal hope that market confidence will thus soon be restored, resulting in a 
renewed investment boom. 
It appears that in negotiating fiscal austerity, the IMF has favoured a less strict approach than 
the EC or the ECB (Blustein 2015, 8). As argued by Ban, the IMF has in fact undergone a 
gradual reform of its ideological underpinnings concerning fiscal consolidation. Rather than 
advocating strict pro-cyclical fiscal austerity measures as in the 1980s and 1990s, core IMF 
officials began to embrace the value of selective Keynesian counter-cyclical fiscal measures. 
A more gradual implementation of fiscal austerity would be considerably less damaging for 
the economy. Too excessive pro-cyclical fiscal measures might in fact cause a downward 
recessionary spiral which cannot necessarily be escaped from, meaning that the economy 
might be caught in recession for several years (2015, 179). 
Countering the supposed reluctance of the IMF to advocate severe fiscal austerity is an ex-
post evaluation by the IMF itself. Published in 2013, the IMF argues that the fiscal adjustment 
could not have been implemented in a more gradual way because of the amount of sovereign 
debt accumulated by Greece. In fact, the programme’s required consolidation of 15 percent of 
GDP was “the minimum needed to bring debt down to 120 percent by 2020” (International 
Monetary Fund 2013, 20-21). In addition, a more gradual approach to fiscal austerity would 
have increased the required financial assistance which would have significantly elevated the 
political costs for both the IMF and the Eurozone member states. As Blustein claims, the IMF 
was not keen on publicly questioning the decisions taken by the troika with regard to the three 
dimensions (2015, 8). This suggests that the IMF could have been outweighed by the EC and 
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the ECB concerning the choice of severe fiscal austerity over a more gradual implementation. 
However, the ex post evaluation published three years after the start of the first programme 
did in fact openly question the decision taken in the third dimension concerning sovereign 
debt restructuring. The ex post approval of the decisions taken in the first dimension suggests 
that the IMF has equally been in favour of severe austerity measures. As a recent study 
claims, the above mentioned supposed ideological reform to embrace selective counter-
cyclical Keynesian policies did not result in an effective change of IMF policies. Rather, it 
served as a discursive means to “obscure the reality of the underlying maintenance of 
business-as-usual practices” (Kentikelenis, Stubbs and King 2016, 546). 
Given that the IMF itself defended severe fiscal austerity while it criticised the absent debt 
restructuring suggests that the hegemony of neoliberalism has been intact in this dimension in 
2010. A more gradual approach to fiscal austerity would in fact still have contained solely 
contractionary policies and would hence not signify a hegemony contested by expansionary 
fiscal policies. Nonetheless, it can be asserted that the EC and the ECB might have been even 
stronger advocates of strict fiscal austerity measures. As for the ECB, its assistance to 
governments by indirect bond purchases on secondary markets, called Securities Markets 
Programme, has been designed in such a way as to not breach the TFEU’s prohibition of 
monetary financing. Government bonds were to be bought not directly from the respective 
governments but from private bond holders operating on the so-called secondary market. Only 
short-term bonds were eligible to be bought by the ECB so that the Eurozone governments 
would be incited to substantially speed up measures aimed to implement fiscal discipline 
(Trichet 2011). With regard to the EC, it has been argued that Germany played a central role 
in the negotiations and achieved to “export its commitment to a stability culture to fellow 
Eurozone states” (Bulmer 2014, 1254). With the EC and the ECB equally advocating severe 
austerity measures, it seems therefore that the neoliberal hegemony has been intact in all three 
troika members concerning the first dimension of contractionary fiscal policies. 
 
The second dimension - devaluation policies 
As for the programme by the EC, internal devaluation ought to be achieved by implementing 
structural reforms in the following sections: pensions, tax administration, public 
administration, labour and product markets as well the financial sector and privatisations of 
publicly held enterprises (European Commission 2010, 18-23). The IMF programme equally 
foresaw privatisations and reforms of the pension system, tax administration, health sector, 
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public administration, labour market and business environment (International Monetary Fund 
2010a, 14-15). In contrast to the first dimension, Blustein states that both the IMF and the EC 
had long tried to advocate structural reforms in Greece. The desperate situation of Greece in 
2010 finally allowed the troika to reform the country by means of conditional financial 
assistance (2015, 9). As the ex post evaluation of the IMF acknowledged, internal devaluation 
through structural reforms was in fact “critical to improving competitiveness”, given the 
limited possibilities within a monetary union (International Monetary Fund 2013, 22). The EC 
and the IMF appeared to agree on primarily focusing on reducing wages in the public sector 
which might instil similar downward adjustments in the private sector since the reforms 
facilitated wage bargaining (International Monetary Fund 2013, 23).  
In the first two years of the programme, the retirement age has been raised to 65 years, about 
30’000 jobs in the public sector have been abolished, several billion in fines for tax evasion 
have been collected and health spending has been reduced by one third (Ardagna and Caselli 
2012, 34). The structural reforms clearly reflect the ideological stance taken by the troika as 
neoliberalism advocates the liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation of economies. In 
times of recession, the drastically increased unemployment rate is likely to considerably 
prolong the recession due to the inflicted shock on total demand. 
It appears that all troika parties preferred internal devaluation over nominal devaluation. A 
possible Greek exit from the Eurozone has not been discussed in the IMF and the EC 
programmes. As the ECB president Trichet argued later in 2010, such an exit would be the 
“worst possible option for Greece” (Smith 2010). From a legal perspective, the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU) merely foresees a possible withdrawal from the European Union, not 
from the European Monetary Union (EUR-Lex 2012, Article 50). If Greece theoretically was 
to exit the Eurozone, it would either also have to leave the European Union or the EU member 
states amend the TEU with regard to the possibility to exit the Eurozone. While a Greek exit 
would thus on the one hand be an institutionally complex issue, the troika’s main motivation 
to exclude a possible Greek exit from the negotiations on the first programme was the risk of 
contagion. An outright Greek default and exit from the Eurozone would considerably increase 
market pressures on other struggling economies such as Portugal, Ireland, or Cyprus (Smith 
2010). In order to avoid further market turmoil, the troika hence not considered a possible exit 
and nominal devaluation, pushing Greece to address the competitiveness problem through 
internal devaluation (International Monetary Fund 2010a, 8). 
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The third dimension - debt restructuring 
The ex post evaluation by the IMF argues that “an upfront debt restructuring would have been 
better for Greece, although this was not acceptable to the euro partners” (International 
Monetary Fund 2013, 28). It therefore seems that the IMF has been outweighed by the EC and 
the ECB on this issue. The two institutions have been concerned with the moral hazard and 
contagion risks that a potential debt restructuring would pose. This suggests that already 
during the negotiations on the first programme, the hegemony of neoliberalism within the 
IMF might not have been completely intact. It appears that the IMF has been internally 
divided over the issue of debt restructuring. Whereas IMF officials of the European 
Department present in the troika negotiations opposed debt restructuring, other departments 
favoured an early restructuring (Blustein 2015, 9-10). Even though the neoliberal hegemony 
seems to have been contested with regard to the issue of debt restructuring, the ultimate 
outcome of the negotiations indicate an intact hegemony. Contrary to the ex post evaluation 
by the IMF, EC official Rehn claimed that no debt restructuring has been proposed by the 
IMF’s Managing Director Strauss-Kahn. His successor Lagarde, then finance minister of 
France, has equally been opposed to restructure Greece’s debt (Rehn quoted in Spiegel and 
Hope 2013). For the first negotiations, the IMF as well as the EC and the ECB will therefore 
still be coded as being opposed to debt restructuring, fulfilling the expectations of the causal 
mechanism. 
 
4.2. The negotiations on the second programme  
After the first programme appeared to get more and more off-track in 2011, Greece requested 
an adjusted second programme in late 2011. A mission comprising IMF, EC and ECB 
officials negotiated from January 17 to February 9, 2012 with the Greek government. Under 
the second programme running from 2012 to 2014, the newly established European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) was to contribute €144 billion and the IMF €28 billion. As with the 
initial financial assistance, both the EC on behalf of the Eurozone member states and the IMF 
signed individual adjustment programmes with Greece (European Commission 2012, 1, 4). 
Some important changes have been made most notably in the first and third dimension, since 
the new programmes adopted a “gradual fiscal adjustment” and involved both “private and 
official sector involvement to deliver enough debt relief”. With the new programme, Greece’s 
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debt is again judged to be “sustainable in the medium term” (International Monetary Fund 
2012, 1, 17). 
 
The first dimension - fiscal policies 
In contrast to the predominantly up-front fiscal adjustment envisaged in the first programme, 
the IMF adopted a gradual approach in the second programme. A small deficit is foreseen for 
the year 2012 followed by moderate fiscal adjustment measures amounting to 2.75 percent of 
GDP respectively in the years 2013 and 2014 (International Monetary Fund 2012, 87). In a 
similar vein, the EC foresees a deficit of one percent of GDP in 2012 and requires a gradual 
move towards surpluses of 1.8 percent of GDP in 2013 and 4.5 percent of GDP in 2014. The 
EC demands thus again slightly stricter fiscal austerity measures than the IMF (European 
Commission 2012, 26). 
The IMF’s break with severe fiscal austerity especially for the year 2012 has been primarily 
introduced to balance the anticipated contractionary impact of the structural reforms 
(International Monetary Fund 2012, 1). Significantly decreased wages and less social security 
contributions by employers would for example inevitably burden Greece’s sovereign fiscal 
balance as the unemployment rate continued to rise throughout 2011 and 2012 (OECD 2017). 
Demanding similar up-front fiscal austerity measures as done under the first programme 
would have most certainly deepened the recession even further and lessened the programme’s 
chances of success. As under the first programme, taxation is not expected to decrease 
societal inequalities. The EC for instance demands a lowering of “high marginal rates on 
labour” (European Commission 2012, 34). This means that natural persons with high incomes 
are taxed less than before, rendering the taxation system less progressive. Despite the embrace 
of milder fiscal austerity, the neoliberal hegemony in this first dimension is still intact since 
no expansionary policies are foreseen. As the EC programme suggests, the Greek deficit for 
2012 would be 2.5 percent of GDP without implementing the programme (European 
Commission 2012, 24). The supposed break with fiscal austerity for 2012 with an allowed 
deficit of 1 percent was therefore no effective counter-cyclical fiscal policy, since Greece still 
had to implement fiscal austerity to meet the programme’s allowed deficit of 1 percent of 
GDP. It can therefore be asserted that the neoliberal hegemony with regard to the first 
dimension persists within the IMF and the EC. 
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As for the ECB, its Securities Markets Programme has been replaced in September 2012 by 
the Outright Monetary Transactions programme. The key difference to the previous 
programme is the theoretically limitless sovereign bond buying possibilities for the ECB. As 
the first programme, the Outright Monetary Transactions programme seeks to enhance 
governmental fiscal discipline. In the case of a breach of the conditions set in the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) which replaced the EFSF in September 2012, the ECB’s 
programme will be stopped (Draghi 2012). Thus both the EC and the ECB share the 
neoliberal embrace of fiscal austerity, as the ESM renders financial assistance conditional on 
the implementation of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms (European Stability 
Mechanism 2017). As in the negotiations on the first programme, all troika members are 
hence coded as confirming to the theoretical expectations with regard to the first dimension of 
contractionary fiscal policies. 
 
The second dimension - devaluation policies 
While the first programmes of the EC and the IMF prioritized wage adjustments in the public 
sector with the hope that the private sector will follow due to facilitated wage bargaining, the 
second programmes directly target wages in the private sector. The programmes attempt to 
render wage bargaining more effective by substantially reducing the general duration of 
contracts and by freezing existing salaries. In addition, minimum wages ought to be reduced 
by 22 percent and even by 32 percent for persons younger than 25. Also, social security 
contributions for employers ought to be reduced by 5 percent (International Monetary Fund 
2012, 51). Privatisations of publicly held enterprises should further be enhanced and closed 
professions more effectively liberalized. The structural reforms envisaged in the first 
programme of pensions, tax administration, public administration and the health sector are to 
be advanced further (European Commission 2012, 31-43). It seems that the troika in fact 
requires stricter internal devaluation policies than in the first programme. The loosened fiscal 
austerity is primarily meant to accommodate the strong contractionary effect of the new 
structural reforms. While internal devaluation is therefore clearly preferred over nominal 
devaluation and a Greek exit of the Eurozone, it appears that the troika does not longer 
perceive a Greek exit as an impossible scenario. As Spiegel states, a group of troika officials 
has in fact been discussing modalities for a potential Greek exit since early 2012 (2014). The 
IMF’s view on the issue leaves however no doubt about which strategy ought to be pursued: 
“Staff agrees that the domestic and external costs of euro exit would be formidable and 
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supports the authorities’ determination to avoid such an exit” (International Monetary Fund 
2012, 42). A Greek exit has been primarily advocated by the German finance minister 
Schäuble, who was however outweighed by the German chancellor Merkel (Spiegel 2014). 
All three troika members are thus coded as being opposed to nominal devaluation and thus 
fulfilling the theoretical expectations.  
 
The third dimension - debt restructuring 
According to the ex post evaluation by the IMF, the institution effectively began to advocate a 
debt restructuring in early 2011 when the first programme appeared to be below expectations. 
While also criticising the EC and the ECB for not having attempted an up-front debt 
restructuring, the Fund argues that it also took the European institutions too long to find a 
common ground concerning the issue in 2011 (International Monetary Fund 2013, 33). Thus 
only in April 2012 a private sector involvement took place. The Independent Evaluation 
Office of the IMF counters this narrative. After the absent explicit advocacy for a debt 
restructuring in the negotiations on the first programme, the IMF neither began to advocate it 
when the programme’s probability of success started to decline in autumn 2010. Due to the 
strong internal divisions on the issue of debt restructuring, the IMF was as slow in pressing 
for debt restructuring as were the EC or the ECB. An effective plan to restructure Greece’s 
sovereign debt only became operational in late 2011, shortly before the opening of the 
negotiations on the second programme (Independent Evaluation Office 2016, 27-28). Despite 
these critiques, it appears that the EC and the ECB have been more reluctant to restructure 
Greece’s debt than the IMF. However, the effective turn towards debt restructuring not 
necessarily means a thorough revision of the neoliberal stance. It could rather present an 
unavoidable necessity to assure Greece’s solvency. As economists argued, Greece has already 
become insolvent by February 2011 which rendered the continued troika assistance unviable 
without a considerable debt restructuring (Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2011, 3). 
The eventual private sector involvement of the second programme has been declared as the 
largest debt relief in history (Xafa 2014). According to the IMF and the EC, private creditors 
held around €200 billion in Greece’s sovereign debt corresponding to about half of Greece’s 
total sovereign debt. The participation rate was expected to be over 95 percent. However, only 
half of these €200 billion would indeed be written off since 35 percent of this sum would be 
exchanged into long-term bonds with a maturity of 30 years and 10 percent exchanged into 
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official EFSF short-term notes. In addition, the Eurozone members agreed to decrease interest 
rates on their financial assistance to Greece (International Monetary Fund 2012, 88-89). The 
overall effect of the debt restructuring of the second programme has thus been fairly modest. 
Merely €100 billion of the total sovereign debt has been written off, corresponding to about 
20 percent of Greece’s total sovereign debt. The effective debt to GDP ratio of Greece in fact 
solely decreased from 172 percent to 160 percent of GDP (Trading Economics 2017). 
Crucially, the private sector involvement did not involve the biggest individual creditor of 
Greece, the ECB. At the end of 2012, the ECB held over €30 billion in Greek bonds with an 
average maturity of under 4 years (European Central Bank 2013). Despite the private sector 
involvement therefore, Greece still was due considerable amounts of short-term debt for the 
programme years 2012, 2013 and 2014. The private sector involvement in fact primarily 
resulted in a drastic redistribution of Greece’s creditors, increasing the share of debt held by 
the troika from about 20 to 75 percent (Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati 2013, 15, 34). It 
could thus be argued that the IMF pushed for private sector involvement primarily for the 
sake of increasing the troika’s political leverage on Greece. Nonetheless, the concluded debt 
restructuring has not been expected by the congruence method, rendering the hegemony of 
neoliberalism within the IMF ‘qualified’ in the negotiations on the second programme. Since 
the EC and the ECB have been formidably reluctant to accept private sector involvement, they 
will be coded as confirming to the theoretical expectation for this dimension. 
 
4.3. Discussion of Results 
The collected data on the negotiations on the first two adjustment programmes for Greece 
appears to corroborate the hypothesis according to which the troika is not questioning the 
appropriateness of the prescribed measures due to the hegemony of neoliberalism. In the 
negotiations on the first programme, institutional positions have been observed as expected by 
the operationalized neoliberal concept. Severe contractionary fiscal policies have been 
prescribed along with internal devaluation reforms. While the issue of debt restructuring 
seems to have been more vividly discussed than the choices in the other two dimensions, the 
overall outcome suggests an intact neoliberal hegemony. The fact that the IMF has been ex-
post questioning the absent initial debt restructuring suggests however that the institution 
would be the most prone to change among the troika members. In the negotiations on the 
second programme, the hegemony of neoliberalism within the IMF proved indeed to be 
‘qualified’. While the troika parties moved to even stricter internal devaluation and had to 
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loosen fiscal austerity accordingly, the hegemony in the first two dimensions overall appears 
to be constant. The second programme rather reflects a changed priority from fiscal austerity 
to internal devaluation than an abandon of neoliberalism. Contrary to the theoretical 
expectations, the IMF advocated a private sector involvement and eventually managed to 
persuade the EC and the ECB. As shown in the analysis however, such a turn away from the 
theoretical expectations might have arisen more from the unavoidable necessity to restructure 
Greece’s debt than from critical self-reflection. Nonetheless, it can be said that the IMF is 
considerably less neoliberal in the third dimension than the EC or the ECB who have been 
reluctant to accept the suggested private sector involvement. The overall outcome of the 
analysis on the first two negotiations thus suggests that global economic governance has been 
able to transmit an altered stance on crisis policies to regional economic governance. Since 
only one dimension has been altered, it cannot be asserted that a counter-hegemonic alliance 
has in fact risen to prominence over the course of the Eurozone crisis analysed above. 
The present constellation of findings does not allow dismissing the possible spuriousness of 
the causal mechanism since the three troika institutions merely differed in their stances in one 
out of six cases. The paper’s causal mechanism assumes that the IMF is the most influential 
institution of the three because of its critical role in global economic governance. In the 
observed case in which the troika disagreed, being debt restructuring, it seems that the IMF 
was indeed the most influential institution and managed to persuade the troika. In order to 
improve the validity of the findings, the third programme will be subsequently discussed. The 
third programme is solely financed by the Eurozone as the IMF refused to participate. It can 
therefore be used to test more closely the influence of neoliberal hegemony among the control 
variables, being the EC and the ECB. 
 
4.4. Control Variables - the third programme 
After Greece’s second programme expired in June 2015, a ‘Third Economic Adjustment 
Programme’ has been negotiated from July 8 to August 19, 2015 between the EC, the ECB 
and Greece. The IMF restricted itself to an advisory role. Running until 2018, the third 
programme foresees financial assistance of €86 billion by the ESM (European Council 2015). 
With regard to the first dimension, a much milder fiscal consolidation is demanded. Allowing 
again a moderate deficit in 2015, Greece ought to improve the fiscal balance gradually by 
0.75 percent of GDP in 2016 to 1.15 percent of GDP in 2017 and 1.75 percent of GDP in 
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2018. In contrast to the first two programmes, these surpluses primarily arise from increased 
revenues from VAT and other taxes and do not involve strong governmental spending cuts 
(European Commission 2015, 6). The second dimension again requires the implementation of 
structural reforms which should contribute to increase Greece’s competitiveness through 
internal devaluation. As under the previous programmes, Greece ought to reform the labour 
market, product market, business environment, regulated professions and network industries 
and proceed with the privatisation process. In addition, the state apparatus ought to be 
‘modernised’ (European Commission 2015, 21-32). While the positions of the EC and the 
ECB on the two dimensions appear to be slightly more lenient than before, they still follow 
the theoretical expectations of neoliberal hegemony. The IMF disregards participating in the 
third programme because it questions whether the programme is likely to succeed. In fact, the 
programme will “require difficult decisions to be made by both Greece and by the Eurozone 
member states. Without these, the IMF would not take a deal to its executive board” 
(Thomsen quoted in Wright 2016). The main reason for the IMF’s refusal to participate in the 
new programme has been the troika’s stance on renewed debt restructuring. It appears that the 
IMF unsuccessfully attempted to push the EC and the ECB to grant Greece official sector 
involvement. In the words of IMF official Moghadam, “Europe should offer substantial debt 
relief - halving Greece’s debt and halving the required fiscal balance - in exchange for 
reform” (2015). 
While the EC and the ECB remained constant with regard to the neoliberal stance in all three 
dimensions in the third programme, it appears that the IMF further altered its view on debt 
restructuring. At the time of the negotiations on the new programme, Greece’s sovereign debt 
ratio amounted to 177 percent of GDP, roughly 20 percent more than after the private sector 
involvement of 2012 (Trading Economics 2017). While the real value of Greece’s sovereign 
debt returned to the pre-programmes amount of around €320 billion, the prolonged recession 
contracted Greece’s GDP by about 15 percent since 2009 (OECD 2017). Due to the moderate 
pace of recovery predicted for the next few years, the IMF regards Greece’s sovereign debt as 
“highly unsustainable” (International Monetary Fund 2015, 1). Given the absent official debt 
restructuring in the third programme, it appears that this time the EC and the ECB have been 
more influential than the IMF. The absent critical self-reflection on behalf of the EC and the 
ECB suggests that global economic governance has not been able to transmit its altered view 
on debt restructuring to regional economic governance. 
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 IMF EC ECB Neoliberal? 
1
st
 Programme     
Fiscal austerity Severe Severe Severe Yes 
Devaluation strategy Internal Internal Internal Yes 
Debt restructuring Opposed Opposed Opposed Yes 
Hegemony Intact Intact Intact  
     
2
nd
 Programme     
Fiscal austerity Gradual Gradual Gradual Yes 
Devaluation strategy Internal Internal Internal Yes 
Debt restructuring Private Reluctant Reluctant No 
Hegemony Qualified Intact Intact  
     
3
rd
 Programme     
Fiscal austerity Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 
Devaluation strategy Internal Internal Internal Yes 
Debt restructuring Official Reluctant Reluctant Yes 
Hegemony Qualified Intact Intact  
 
Table 1: Recapitulation of the empirical analysis 
 
5. Conclusion 
As previously indicated, the results corroborate the hypothesis according to which the 
hegemony of neoliberalism explains the persistence of neoliberal measures despite the deep 
recessionary impact. It is believed that relevant data could be sufficiently accessed to well 
code the variables although similar studies on other Eurozone countries under troika 
programmes would certainly strengthen the validity of the findings of this paper. The process-
tracing of the negotiations on the three economic adjustment programmes suggests that the 
IMF is the sole troika member which altered its stance on one of the three dimensions of 
neoliberalism. 
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The main purpose of analysing the control variables was to be able to eliminate the possibility 
of spuriousness, being external variables biasing the causal mechanism between the 
independent and the dependent variable. Since the causal mechanism focuses on the role of 
neoliberalism within the IMF on the overall position of the troika to Greece, the role of the 
EC and the ECB within the troika has equally been analysed. The outcome of the analysis of 
the control variables still does not allow dismissing the possible spuriousness of the causal 
mechanism. It appears that the troika members only disagreed twice over the course of the 
Eurozone crisis. In the first instance, the IMF has been able to persuade the EC and the ECB 
on the necessity of private sector involvement. In the second instance, the IMF has not been 
able to persuade the EC and the ECB to advance official sector involvement. It thus cannot be 
stated with security that the IMF is the most influential member of the troika. It rather seems 
that the balance of power has been permanently evolving between three largely equally 
powerful institutions. The reluctance to grant official sector involvement suggests that the 
transmittance of an altered policy stance from global to regional economic governance is not 
instant. Since the outcome of the programmes show that fiscal austerity alone cannot 
significantly reduce Greece’s sovereign debt, the IMF should further seek an active role in the 
Eurozone in order to advocate the necessity of debt restructuring in the case of Greece.  
To conclude, the analysis thus suggests that the IMF altered its view on one dimension and 
hence moved from an ‘intact’ to a ‘qualified’ neoliberal hegemony. It appears therefore that 
overall the first grand systemic crisis of the 21
st
 century has not seen an effective rise of a 
challenging counter-hegemonic ideology. Most importantly, neither contractionary fiscal 
austerity nor contractionary internal devaluation has been questioned by the troika. It is thus 
necessary to increase efforts to advocate strong alternatives to neoliberalism on both global 
and regional levels of economic governance. In order to overcome the continued rise of global 
inequalities, the IMF, the centre of global economic governance, has to be pushed further to 
reform its ideological underpinnings. As under the initial dissemination of neoliberal practice 
(Peet 2009, 15), a reform of the IMF’s ideological underpinnings is hoped to generate a 
‘trickle-down’ effect to the numerous institutions in charge of regional economic governance 
worldwide. This is necessary to ensure that future systemic crises indeed result in the open 
challenging of neoliberalism and see the move towards more socially just economic policies. 
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